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ABSTRACT 
 
Regulation FD, imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 
2000, was designed to create a level playing field by prohibiting selective disclosure of 
material private information to particular groups. Exactly what advantage these groups 
gain is unclear. If multiple insiders receive identical information, the information is 
immediately incorporated in price and the expected profit of each insider is zero. 
Regardless of the SEC’s motivation in imposing Regulation FD, empirical investigation 
has shown that it has had a chilling effect, with firms now disclosing less information. 
With less information flow, private information becomes more long-lived and valuable. 
With increased risk of providing immediacy to informed traders, market makers will 
demand increased compensation, widening the bid/ask spread. To test this proposition, 
we identify the cost components of the bid/ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks in 
the period just before and just after the implementation of Regulation FD. The evidence 
indicates that Regulation FD has led to an increase in the expected cost of the adverse 
selection component of the spread. 
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Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection 
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading Regulation became effective on October 23, 2000.1,2 In a section popularly 
referred to as Regulation Fair Disclosure (or simply “Regulation FD”), the SEC 
exercised its intention to create a level playing field for all investors with respect to 
accessing price sensitive information. Regulation FD prohibits the selective disclosure of 
material non-public information to exclusive groups or individuals such as investment 
analysts or institutional investors. If material disclosures are intended through such 
briefings, the same information must be disclosed simultaneously to the investing public. 
In the event of any inadvertent selective disclosure of material information, a public 
announcement is required to be made within 24 hours by filing a Form 8-K or through a 
medium capable of mass and unbiased distribution [see SEC (2000a)].   
The motivation for imposing Regulation FD was the belief that certain members 
of the investment community with access to private information had a trading advantage 
over (and at the expense of) the wider investing public. In the past, corporate managers 
have used private briefings with key analysts to guide or manage earnings forecasts of 
analysts so as to minimize surprises and sudden price movements on earnings 
announcements.3 The former SEC Chairman Levitt expressed the view that this 
constituted artificial smoothing and delayed the price discovery process giving undue 
trading advantage to a favored few and their clients [see SEC (2000a)].  He also 
commented that, 
“…when information travels only to a privileged few, when that information is 
used to profit at the expense of the investing public, when that information comes 
by way of favored access rather than by acumen, insight, or diligence, we must 
ask, “Whose interest is really being served?”  If investors see a stock’s price 
change dramatically—but are given access to critical market-moving information 
only much later—we risk nothing less than the public’s faith and confidence in 
America’s capital markets.” 
  Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman of SEC [see SEC (2000b)] 
                                                 
1 See www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm 
2 See www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldisal.htm 
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Regulation FD has been plagued by a continuing debate with respect to its 
desirability and efficacy.  The SEC argued that Regulation FD would improve investor 
confidence in the integrity of the capital markets by reducing the “potential for corporate 
management to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors” [see SEC 
(2000a)].  Reliance on private briefings may have compromised analysts into issuing 
favorable reports so to maintain access to corporate management; the new regulation 
would force analysts to do more independent research. The regulation would improve 
information flow to the market and remove the opportunity for selective recipients to 
trade on private information.4 Finally, implementation would not be costly given recent 
technological developments that facilitate rapid and mass dissemination of information.  
The academic literature on market microstructure and trading strategy offers little 
support for the SEC’s position. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1996), for example, show that if there are multiple informed traders with 
identical information, you get a bang, bang result whereby the information is immediately 
incorporated into price and insiders’ expected profit is zero. Hence, analysts and their 
clients would receive no benefit from the private briefing. Foster and Viswanathan go on 
to show that, if the information is not identical and not perfectly correlated, insiders can 
exploit the information and earn some of the potential profits—the amount depending 
upon the degree of correlation of the insiders information. In the case being addressed by 
Regulation FD, however, the analysts receive identical information at the private briefing 
and no exploitable profit opportunity.  
Views from the investment industry regarding the desirability of Regulation FD 
are, at best, neutral. Before the imposition of Regulation FD, the Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII) expressed the view that Regulation FD would not reduce communications 
from corporations because  
“… in order to continue attracting capital, issuers will meet the market’s demand 
for investment information …” [see CII (2000)].   
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Richardson et al (2004) offer evidence that suggests that firms provide private information to analysts in 
order to manage EPS expectations downward, setting the stage for subsequently realized EPS to beat 
analysts’ forecasts. 
4 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that informed trading reduces market liquidity and increases price 
volatility. 
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But, this is neither an argument for or against Regulation FD in the sense that it implies 
that the regulation will have no meaningful effect. Critics, on the other hand, were more 
vocal. They argued that Regulation FD would have a “chilling” effect, with firms 
reducing the quality and quantity of information flowing to the market. One reason is that 
firms prefer to release information to a selected audience rather than to the investing 
public at large. By constraining their audience to, say, analysts, the firm can reduce the 
proprietary costs of disclosure and limit the litigation risk that may arise from 
misinterpretation of detailed or complex information releases by less skilled users. In 
addition, analysts can be constrained to using private information purely to inform 
earnings forecasts and for no other purpose.5 Another incentive for the firm to disclose 
less is that they reduce the prospect of legal action against the firm by the SEC.  The 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), for example, expressed 
the concern that  
“Corporations will almost certainly curtail the information flow to the market to 
avoid having to decide on the spot whether certain information will be deemed to 
be material after the fact by the SEC ….” [see AIMR (2000)]. 
 
Information would tend to be released in standard or raw form with little value added in 
terms of management guidance. Without guidance from management (through the analyst 
community) with respect to interpretation, users would have to make their own inferences 
[see Weber (2000)].   
Views from the investment industry on impact of Regulation FD since October 
2000 are fairly consistent. In a recent survey, the Security Industry Association (SIA) 
found that 72 percent of analysts interviewed believe that information flowing to the 
public from corporations is now of lower quality [see AIMR (2001)]. Likewise, a March 
2001 survey of AIMR members revealed that 57 percent (14 percent) of its members 
believed that Regulation FD had reduced (increased) the quantity of information flow to 
investors. Similarly, 56 percent (15 percent) believed that the quality of information had 
                                                 
5 See Irani and Karamanou (2003) for a more detailed account. 
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decreased (increased). Further, 71 percent stated that the reduced information flow 
increased market volatility.6   
The survey evidence, while informative, does not measure the impact of 
Regulation FD on the information environment. A number of empirical studies have 
attempted to fill the void by examining the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
and the behavior of stock return volatility, trading volume, and/or bid-ask spreads in the 
months surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. While these studies, too, are 
informative, they provide only indirect measures of whether there is more or less 
informed trading taking place. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of 
informed trading and the cost of adverse selection in the period immediately before and 
immediately after the implementation of Regulation FD. We do so by examining the cost 
components of market maker bid/ask spreads in the NASDAQ market. The evidence 
suggests that, while spreads have fallen over time, the probability of informed trading and 
the size of the adverse selection component of the spread have risen. The outline of the 
paper is as follows. In the first section, we review the results of the empirical work that 
has focused on the effects of Regulation FD. The second section contains a description of 
the theoretical model, and the third section contains a description of the sample. The 
fourth section contains the empirical analyses and a discussion of the results. The paper 
concludes with a brief summary. 
 
I. PAST LITERATURE 
Now that Regulation FD is in effect, what was a debate surrounding its 
desirability has turned to empirical examination of its effectiveness. Effectiveness can be 
measured in a number of ways. One way is to examine whether Regulation FD has 
changed the disclosure environment in some manner. Have the quantity, quality, and 
frequency of voluntary disclosure by firms, for example, increased or decreased? Along 
the same line, have the accuracy and/or the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts changed in a 
significant manner? Another way is to look for capital market effects. Have market 
                                                 
6 In contrast, a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers finds eighty percent of executives surveyed see a 
positive or neutral effect through the introduction of Regulation FD (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). 
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activity measures such as trading volume and return volatility increased or decreased? 
Finally, while both of the above streams of research speak to the question of whether or 
not Regulation FD has had a chilling effect on information releases, they do not speak 
directly to the issue of informed trading. If there has been a chilling effect, private 
information becomes more long-lived and, hence, more valuable. In such an 
environment, the adverse selection cost component of the bid/ask spread will increase. 
This third stream of research, related to ours, is directed at the effect of Regulation FD on 
the bid/ask spread and the probability of informed trading. Measurement of these 
variables is critical since it is the change in these variables that measures the degree to 
which the playing field has been leveled. 
A. Changes in the disclosure environment 
Among the first studies to have examined the effects of Regulation FD is Heflin, 
Subramanyam and Zhang (2003a). They focus on three issues: (a) the accuracy and 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, (b) the frequency of firms’ voluntary 
disclosures, and (c) the informational efficiency of stock prices prior to firms’ earnings 
announcements. The intuition underlying the use of analyst forecasts is that the 
curtailment of analysts’ privileged access to management guidance may reduce the 
accuracy and increase the dispersion of their forecasts.7 Their evidence suggests that 
there has been no significant change in analyst forecast accuracy or dispersion. The 
motivation for examining voluntary disclosures is that some critics argued that 
Regulation FD would cause management to be less forthcoming with information due to 
factors such as increased litigation risk. Here, they find a significant increase in the 
frequency of voluntary public disclosures after Regulation FD. Finally, on the issue of 
informational efficiency, they measure “information gap” (i.e., the absolute deviation in 
stock price between various pre-earnings-announcement days and the post-earnings-
announcement day after controlling for market wide movements8) both before and after 
Regulation FD came into effect and find no evidence that information available to the 
                                                 
7 In related work, Brown, Taylor, and Walter (1999) examine the accuracy of forecasts before and after 
sanctions placed on firms that did not comply with Australian Stock Exchange requirements.  
8 Specifically, they measure absolute cumulative abnormal return from 64 days before to 2 days after an 
earnings announcement. The smaller the “information gap,” the greater the information available to the 
market pre-announcement.   
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market prior to earnings announcements had deteriorated after Regulation FD. If 
anything, the evidence suggests that the information gap between pre- and post-
announcement price has become smaller since the introduction of Regulation FD.  
Other studies focusing on the accuracy and dispersion of analyst forecasts include 
Agrawal and Chadha (2002), Mohanram and Sunder (2001) and Shane et al (2001).  
Unlike Heflin et al (2003a), these studies report that analysts’ forecasts have been less 
accurate and have had higher dispersion9 in the post-FD period. Shane et al (2001) add 
that deterioration in forecast accuracy in the post-FD period tends to be true for forecasts 
issued earlier in the quarter as opposed to those issued later in the quarter. In other words, 
shorter-term forecasts do not suffer deterioration in accuracy. Meanwhile Mohanram and 
Sunder (2001) report analysts who were ranked as All-Stars (superior analysts) were less 
affected and that there was also a greater importance placed on idiosyncratic information 
search and analysis in the post-FD period.  They assert superior analysts are, therefore, 
more likely to differentiate themselves in the post-FD environment and that the regulation 
has not negatively impacted on analysts’ incentives to gather information.   
B. Changes in trading behavior 
The effects of Regulation FD on stock return volatility and trading volume have 
also been examined. The intuition here is with continuous and complete information 
flow, stock prices adjust quickly and accurately to their fair values. A move toward 
providing more continuous and complete information to market participants will result in 
lower stock return volatility and higher trading volume, and vice versa.  
The empirical evidence regarding the effect of Regulation FD on return volatility 
is mixed. Heflin et al (2003b), Gadarowski and Sinha (2002), and Shane et al (2001) find 
a significant decrease in return volatility after Regulation FD. While on face appearance 
this seems to support position that there was an improvement in the information 
environment, these assessments fail to account for the reduction in the minimum tick size 
from sixteenths to decimal that occurred during the investigation periods. Bailey et al 
                                                 
9 Irani and Karamanou (2003) and Bailey et al (2003) also report an increase in forecast dispersion after 
Regulation FD. 
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(2003) correct for this problem and find no significant change in return volatility. 
Similarly, Eleswarapu et al (2002) finds no change.  
Bailey et al (2003) also examine trading volume before and after the 
implementation of Regulation FD. They report a significant increase in trading volume in 
the post-Regulation FD period after controlling for the effects of decimalization. They 
attribute the increase to differential informed judgment or difference in opinion.   
C. Changes in bid/ask spread and the probability of informed trading 
Perhaps the most direct measure of information asymmetry used in the empirical 
literature to date is the market maker’s bid/ask spread. The bid/ask spread is a function of 
order processing costs, inventory-holding costs, adverse selection costs, and competition. 
To the extent that order processing costs, inventory-holding costs, and competition 
among market makers are unaffected by Regulation FD, a change in spread must be 
driven by a change in adverse selection costs. Sunder (2002) uses relative bid-ask spread 
as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
traders of firms using conference calls to communicate.  In the pre-FD period, he finds 
firms disclosing information through “restricted” conference calls had higher bid-ask 
spreads (higher information asymmetry) than firms that used “open” conference calls.10  
These differences do not persist in the post-FD period, however. Based on this evidence, 
he concludes that the playing field has been leveled. Unfortunately, Sunder’s regression 
model does not explicitly isolate the information asymmetry cost component of the 
bid/ask spread. His results can be driven by cross-sectional variation in any cost 
component of bid/ask spread including order processing costs, inventory-holding costs, 
and competition. In addition, the use of relative spread in a regression model that includes 
an intercept is problematic. 
Eleswarapu et al (2003) proxy information asymmetry using the relative bid-ask 
spread but include a measure of the order flow imbalance in the manner of Huang and 
Stoll (1996). Using data on trading days surrounding earnings-related announcements, 
they find a reduction in information asymmetry after the introduction of Regulation FD, 
                                                 
10 Firms using ‘restricted’ conference calls made their calls available to analysts and institutional investors 
only while those using ‘open’ calls always held calls accessible to all investors. 
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with the reduction being most noticeable in less liquid firms. Strasser (2002) uses two 
measures of information asymmetry: (a) the probability of informed trading based on 
Easley, Keifer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996); and (b) the adverse selection component of 
the spread derived from a modified version of Huang and Stoll (1997). He finds that both 
approaches show that the probability of informed trading does not change significantly 
between the pre- and post-FD periods. Aslan (2003) also uses the Easley et al (1996) 
model and concludes that the probability of informed trading has decreased for medium 
and large firms but has increased for small firms. Unfortunately, these approaches depend 
on theoretical models that assume that the only time-series variation in spread is driven 
by informational asymmetry. Temporal movements in order processing costs, inventory-
holding costs, and competition are assumed away by fiat. Without explicitly modeling the 
effects of these variables, the results must be interpreted cautiously.  
 
II. MODEL 
 In order to assess the probability and expected cost of informed trading in the pre- 
and post-Regulation FD periods, a formal model of the market maker’s bid/ask spread is 
necessary. Such a model must identify all of the components of the spread including 
minimum tick size, order processing costs, inventory-holding costs, asymmetric 
information costs, and competition. It must also be straightforward to estimate. To this 
end, we adopt the bid/ask spread regression model developed in Bollen, Smith and 
Whaley (2004) (hereafter “BSW”). This section has three parts. In the first, we describe a 
simple version of the BSW regression model to illustrate the underlying economic 
intuition regarding its structure. In the second, we present the full-blown model that 
explicitly specifies (and allows us to estimate) the probability and the expected cost of 
informed trading. Finally, we explain how the model can be used to identify incremental 
costs arising from a market intervention such as the SEC’s Regulation FD.  
A. Components of bid/ask spread 
The first regression model developed in BSW has the specification,  
0 1 2 3i i i i iSPRD InvTV MHI IHPα α α α ε= + + + + ,   (1) 
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where iSPRD  is the bid/ask spread of stock i, iInvTV  is the inverse of trading volume, 
iMHI  is the modified Herfindahl index, and iIHP  is the inventory-holding premium. In 
this model, the specific components of the bid/ask spread are 0α , the minimum tick size; 
1 iInvTVα , order processing costs; 2 iMHIα , competition; and 3 iIHPα , the sum of the 
inventory holding and informational asymmetry components of the spread. The rationale 
for each variable on the right-hand side of the regression (1) is described in turn. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (1), 0α , is the exchange-mandated 
minimum tick size. It serves as the lower bound on the bid/ask spread. For actively traded 
securities with highly competitive markets, the values of all three regressors on the right 
hand side of Eq. (1) are near or at zero, and the bid/ask spread equals the intercept term 
0α  (the stock’s minimum price increment). The second term models the effects of order-
processing costs (e.g., the exchange seat, floor space rent, computer costs, informational 
service costs, labor costs, and the opportunity cost of the market maker’s time). Because 
these costs are largely fixed, at least in the short run, their contribution to the size of the 
bid/ask spread should fall with trading volume; that is, the higher the trading volume, the 
lower the bid/ask spread.11 The third term captures the effects of competition among 
market makers. Of the proxies used in past research, the Herfindahl index makes the most 
sense in that it accounts for the number of market makers in a particular stock as well as 
the relative activity of each market maker. In its raw form, the Herfindahl index has a 
range from 1/ iNM  (perfect competition) to 1 (single monopolist), where iNM  is the 
number of market makers. We create and apply a modified version of the Herfindahl 
index, 
1/
1 1/
i i
i
i
HI NMMHI
NM
−= − .    (2) 
                                                 
11 To some degree, however, this relation may be weakened by the fact that market makers often make 
markets in more than one security. In such cases, fixed order-processing costs can be amortized over total 
trading volume across securities. In addition, in a highly competitive market, bid/ask spreads should equal 
the expected marginal cost of supplying liquidity, in which case order-processing costs may be irrelevant. 
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iMHI  has a range from zero to one, thereby permitting the coefficient of iMHI  in our 
regression model Eq. (1) to have a more natural interpretation; that is, where 1iMHI = , 
the coefficient is an estimate of the rent per share being charged by a monopolistic 
market maker, and where 0iMHI = , the rent is zero. 
The fourth term on the right-hand side of (1) is the market maker’s “inventory-
holding premium.” This premium is demanded by the market maker to cover the 
expected cost of accommodating a customer order and then having the stock price move 
against him, independent of whether the trade is initiated by an informed or an 
uninformed customer. Assuming that the market maker sets his inventory-holding 
premium (IHP) component of the bid/ask spread such that he minimizes the risk of losing 
money should the market move against him, his demanded compensation will be 
    ( ) ( )| 0 Pr 0IHP E S S S= − ∆ ∆ < ∆ < .   (3) 
According to Eq. (3), the minimum IHP equals the expected loss on the trade conditional 
on an adverse stock price movement times the probability of an adverse stock price 
movement.  
For implementation purposes, it is useful to note that the value of the inventory-
holding premium given by the expression on the right hand-side of Eq. (3) equals the 
value of an at-the-money option with expiration given by the time that the stock is held in 
inventory. Under the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) (hereafter, BSM) 
option valuation framework, the expected inventory-holding premium may be written 
( ) ( )ln ln.5 .5S X S XIHP SN t XN t
t t
σ σσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
,  (4) 
where S  is the true stock price at the time at which the market maker opens his position, 
X  is the exercise price of the option, σ  is the standard deviation of security return, t is 
the time until the offsetting order, and ( )N ⋅  is the cumulative unit normal density 
function.12 Since the time until an offsetting order arrives is assumed to be small, the 
                                                 
12 The inventory-holding premium may also be valued using the put valuation formula, which leads to 
identical results. 
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interest rate term in the BSM model is ignored. Eq. (4) can be further simplified by 
acknowledging the fact that the option is at-the-money, in which case the inventory-
holding premium is simply 
( )2 .5 1IHP S N tσ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ .    (5) 
The difficulty in valuing the expected inventory-holding premium using Eq. (5) is 
that the market maker, at the time of trade, does not know when an offsetting transaction 
will occur. The BSM model does not apply to options with stochastic times to expiration. 
Fortunately, all is not lost. BSW show that IHP is approximately linear in t . If such is 
the case, the expected inventory-holding premium may be written  
( ) ( )( )2 .5 1E IHP S N E tσ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,     
where ( )E t  is the expected value of the square root of the time between offsetting 
trades. This expectation is easily estimated using transaction data and is the only aspect 
of the distribution of arrivals that is necessary to approximate expected IHP. 
To summarize, in estimating Eq. (1), the coefficient 1α  is expected to be positive 
and may be large. After all, it represents the market maker’s total order-processing costs. 
If the market is extremely competitive, however, the market maker may not have the 
ability to recover fixed costs, in which case the coefficient will be indistinguishably 
different from zero.13 The coefficient 2α  should be positive. The fewer the number of 
dealers and the less evenly distributed the trading volume across dealers, the higher the 
modified Herfindahl index and the higher the spread. The coefficient 3α  should also be 
positive. The higher the expected inventory-holding premium, the greater the bid/ask 
spread. In this initial specification, iIHP  is estimated as a single at-the-money option, 
with no distinction drawn between informed and uninformed traders. With a precise 
estimate of the expected length of market maker’s holding period, the coefficient value 
should be one.  
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B. Informed versus uninformed traders 
A market maker will demand different inventory-holding premia for trades with 
informed and uninformed traders. Assume that the market maker currently has no 
inventory, and a trader steps forward and buys at the market maker’s posted ask price, 
askS . The market maker, now short a share of stock, is concerned about his expected loss 
should the share price increase. If the trader is uninformed (U), the expected inventory-
holding premium, UIHP , equals the value of a slightly out-of-the-money call option with 
an exercise price equal to askS . Presumably the true price of the underlying stock is 
somewhere between the bid and ask price quotes. If the trader is informed (I), the true 
price of the stock rests somewhere above the ask price, in which case the expected 
inventory-holding premium, IIHP , equals the value of a slightly in-the-money call.  In 
either case, the valuation of the IHP is 
( ) ( )ln ln.5 .5i ii i S X S XIHP S N t XN tt tσ σσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, (6) 
where ,i U I=  depending upon whether the trade was with an uninformed or an informed 
trader. 
From the market maker’s perspective, the required inventory-holding premium, 
IHP, equals the sum of the expected inventory-holding cost and expected adverse 
selection cost components of the spread, that is, 
(1 )I U I IIHP p IHP p IHP= − + ,    (7) 
where Ip  (1 Ip− ) is the probability of an informed (uninformed) trade. To illustrate the 
tradeoff between the required costs of uninformed and informed trades, consider the 
following illustration. Ignoring all factors influencing the bid/ask spread except the 
inventory-holding premia, the spread equals the sum of the expected costs of trading with 
uninformed and informed traders, that is,  
                                                                                                                                                 
13 In the empirical tests that follow, total trading volume across dealers, not trading volume for a particular 
dealer, is used in the cross-sectional regressions. This, too, downward biases the estimate of 1α . 
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(1 )I U I ISPRD p IHP p IHP= − + .   (8) 
To value the inventory-holding premium for the uninformed trader, UIHP , we value a 
slightly out-of-the-money call option. The true stock price is set equal to the midpoint of 
the bid/ask spread, and the exercise price is set equal to the ask price.14 The bid/ask 
midpoint is $27.50, the bid/ask spread is $.10, and the volatility rate of the stock is fifty 
percent. To value the inventory-holding premium for the informed trader, IIHP , we need 
to compute option values over a range of “true” stock prices since the true stock price is 
unobservable. Stock prices ranging from one percent to ten percent in excess of the 
exercise price are used. The average time between offsetting trades is allowed to vary 
between five minutes and thirty minutes. Based on these assumptions, the probability of 
an informed trade conditional on the amount of information (i.e., the degree to which 
IIHP  is in the money) and the time between offsetting trades is computed. These results 
are reported in Table 1. Where the true price is only slightly above the ask price, the 
probability of an informed trade is high. Conversely, where the true price exceeds the 
exercise price by a large amount, the probability of an informed trade is low. The inverse 
relation between these variables in each column of the table reflects the fact that, for a 
given time between trades, UIHP  is constant. Assuming the spread is also constant, the 
probability of an informed trade must vary inversely with IIHP . 
Another feature of the inventory-holding premium (7) is worth noting. First, the 
expected IHP does not go to zero as the time between offsetting trades goes to zero. To 
see this, consider the market maker’s demanded compensation for the two types of 
traders. If the market is highly active (i.e., 0t → ), the market maker will not require 
compensation for the inventory-holding costs of the uninformed trader since the position 
acquired from providing the market with immediacy is immediately unwound (i.e., the 
inventory-holding premium of an uninformed trade UIHP  goes to zero as 0t →  because 
the option is out of the money). The inventory-holding premium of an informed trade, 
IIHP , however, approaches the dollar amount the option is in the money (i.e., the 
                                                 
14 Given the symmetry of the problem, the illustration considers only trades at the ask. A complementary 
analysis can be conducted using a slightly out-of-the-money put whose exercise price equals the bid price. 
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difference between the true price and the ask price in the case of a buy, and the difference 
between the bid price and the true price in the case of a sell). This result, too, is intuitive. 
In a highly active market, the market maker immediately realizes the full cost of 
providing immediacy to an informed trader. Thus, when the time between offsetting 
trades is zero, the market maker’s demanded compensation is I IIHP p IHP= . 
 Another way of viewing the market maker’s inventory-holding premium is   
( )U I I UIHP IHP p IHP IHP= + − .   (9) 
Eq. (9) says that an expected inventory-holding premium of UIHP  exists for all trades, 
uninformed and informed alike, as a result of the price risk associated with having the 
security in inventory. For informed trades, however, there is an incremental expected cost 
is associated with adverse selection, that is, ( )I I Up IHP IHP− . The structure of Eq. (9) 
also provides a means of estimating the probability of informed trades, as we will see 
shortly. 
 Before focusing specifically on estimating the probability of informed trading, we 
need to address a subtle issue. In estimating the inventory-holding premium, we use the 
average time between trades as a proxy for the market maker’s expected holding period. 
Because trades appearing in the data base are executed by many market makers, our 
proxy understates the length of the holding period. To estimate the length of the holding 
period across market makers, we set the coefficient 3α  to one in Eq. (1) and estimate the 
length of the holding period iτ  by scaling each individual stocks average square root of 
time between trades by a constant factor. The regression specification is 
0 1 2 ( )i i i i i iSPRD InvTV MHI IHPα α α τ ε= + + + + .  (10) 
 Finally, with the time between trades, iτ , set so as to create a coefficient value 
equal to one, we can estimate the probability of informed versus uninformed trades across 
stocks.  In Eq. (9), we showed that the inventory-holding premium consists of a common 
expected cost across trades, UIHP  plus an incremental expected cost associated with 
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informed trades, ( )I I Up IHP IHP− . Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (10) provides the 
regression specification, 
0 1 2 , 4 , ,( ) ( ( ) ( ))i i i U i i I i i U i i iSPRD InvTV MHI IHP IHP IHPα α α τ α τ τ ε= + + + + − + , (11) 
where the coefficient 4α represents the probability of an informed trade. Specifying the 
regression in this manner has two important advantages. First, it removes a serious 
collinearity problem that would likely exist between ,I iIHP  and ,U iIHP . Second, it allows 
us to test the null hypothesis that the probability of an informed trade is equal to zero. 
C. Incremental effects due to Regulation FD 
 To assess whether Regulation FD affected the probability and expected cost of 
informed trading, we need to allow for the fact the any of the factors affecting bid/ask 
spread may have changed from the pre- to the post-FD periods. To do so, we re-specify 
Eq. (11) in a way that allows all components to change, that is,  
 0 1 2 3 , 4 , ,
5 6 7 8 , 9 , ,
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i i i U i i I i i U i i
t i t i t U i i t I i i U i i t i
SPRD InvTV MHI IHP IHP IHP
d InvTV d MHI d IHP d IHP IHP d
α α α α τ α τ τ
α α α α τ α τ τ ε
= + + + + −
+ + + + + − + (12) 
In Eq. (12), the td  is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 0 before Regulation FD 
was imposed and 1 afterward. The coefficients 5α through 9α  measure incremental 
effects: 5α is the shift in the minimum spread, 6α  is the shift in order processing costs, 
7α is the shift in the effect of order processing costs, and 8α is the shift in inventory-
holding costs. The effects of Regulation FD on informed trading are captured in the 
coefficient 9α . The coefficient 9α  is the change in the probability of informed trading, 
and the product 9 , ,( ( ) ( ))I i i U i iIHP IHPα τ τ− is the change in the expected cost of market 
makers trading with informed customers. Eq. (12) provides the framework for our 
empirical assessments in Section IV.  
III. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE AND SPREAD ESTIMATION 
Measuring the effects of Regulation FD is complicated by the fact that the stock 
market was in transition in the months surrounding October 2000. In particular, the New 
York Stock Exchange had begun to switch from sixteenths to decimal pricing in August 
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2000, two months before the enactment of Regulation FD. The transition was not 
completed until January 2001, three months after. This change in minimum tick size 
complicates matters in the sense that it reduces our ability to accurately measure the 
bid/ask spread and its components.15 To avoid the confounding effects of decimalization, 
we focus on NASDAQ stocks. For NASDAQ stocks, the change to decimal pricing did 
not occur until April 9, 2001.16 We define the pre-Regulation FD period to be the five 
months before the implementation of the rule in October 2000 (i.e., May 2000 through 
September 2000) and the post-Regulation FD period to be the five months after but 
before decimal pricing (November 2000 through March 2001). The use of NASDAQ 
stocks has the additional advantage that monthly information on the number of market 
makers for each stock is available. Historical files containing the number of dealers 
making markets on NASDAQ as well as their respective trading volumes are available on 
a monthly basis on www.Nasdaqtrader.com.  
The trade and quote data used in this study were downloaded from NYSE’s Trade 
and Quote (TAQ) data files. For all time-stamped trades on TAQ, we matched the quotes 
prevailing immediately prior to the trade. From this matched file, we then computed six 
summary statistics for each stock each day: (a) the number of trades, (b) the end-of-day 
share price (the last bid/ask midpoint prior to 4:00 p.m. EST), (c) the number of shares 
traded, (d) the equal-weighted quoted spread, (e) the volume-weighted effective spread, 
and (f) the average of the square root of the time between trades.  
To test the robustness of our results, we compute two measures of spread. The 
first is quoted spread, that is,  
Quoted spread ask price bid pricet t t= − .   (13) 
We measure equal-weighted quoted spread (EWQS) as the arithmetic average of the 
prevailing quoted spreads at the time of each transaction t of a particular stock during the 
trading day. The second is the effective spread. The effective spread is based on the 
                                                 
15 Bailey et al (2003) argue studies documenting a reduction in return volatility in the post-FD period is 
attributable to the move to decimal pricing. 
16 Fifteen NASDAQ stocks began trading in decimal on March 12, 2001, with an additional 177 stocks 
beginning March 26, 2001. The remaining 4,650 stocks were converted to decimal pricing on April 9, 
2001. 
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notion that the trade is only costly to the investor to the extent that the trade price 
deviates from the true price, approximated by the bid/ask price midpoint, 
(bid price ask price )Midpoint
2
t t
t
+= .   (14) 
On a round-turn, the cost would be incurred twice, hence the measure of the effective 
spread is 
Effective spread 2 trade price midpointt t t= − .  (15) 
Note that if all trades take place at the prevailing bid and ask quotes, the effective spread 
equals the quoted spread. If some trades take place within the spread, the effective spread 
is smaller than the quoted spread. The volume-weighted effective spread (VWES) is a 
volume-weighted average of the effective spreads of the trades occurring throughout the 
day. 
With the six summary statistics compiled for each stock each day, we compute 
average values for each stock across all days in the month. To mitigate the effects of 
outliers, we constrain the sample to include only stocks whose shares traded at least five 
times each day every day during the month.  
Three additional measures are then appended to each monthly stock trade record. 
First, the modified Herfindahl index is computed. This competition measure incorporates 
the numbers of dealers making a market as well as their respective trading volumes. 
Second, the rate of return volatility for each stock is computed using daily returns over 
the sixty trading days preceding the sample month. The returns were obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices daily return file, and the daily return standard 
deviation was annualized using the factor 252 . Finally, the inventory-holding premium 
for each stock is computed using Eq. (5), where S is the stock’s average share price, σ  is 
the annualized return volatility, and ( )E t  is the average of the square root of the time 
between trades.17 With more than one market maker, this estimate understates the 
                                                 
17 Because volatility is expressed on an annualized basis, the time between trades must be measured in 
years. To accomplish this task, we divide the number of minutes between trades by 390 (the number of 
minutes in a trading day) and then by 252 (the number of trading days in a year). 
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expected inventory-holding premium. If trading volume was uniformly distributed across 
all dealers, we could multiply the average by the number of dealers. But, this value would 
cause inventory-holding premiums to be overstated, because only a handful of dealers 
account for the lion’s share of the trading volume of a stock. We later allow the data to 
infer the square root of the average time between trades.18 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The analyses provided in this section have four parts. First, we examine 
descriptive statistics for the bid/ask spread and its determinants in the sub-period before 
and after Regulation FD became effective. Second, we compare the performance of the 
simplified version of the BSW regression model with an ad hoc model based on past 
research. Third, we estimate the change in the expected cost of informed trading. Finally, 
we partition the effective bid/ask spread into its basic cost components. 
A. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 contains summary statistics of the bid/ask spreads of the stocks included 
in the sample. Also included are summary statistics of the spread determinants. The table 
contains a number of interesting results. The bid/ask spread measures, for example, drop 
significantly from the first sub-period to the second. The volume-weighted quoted spread 
is 13.23 cents on average during the pre-Regulation FD sub-period and is 11.43 cents 
afterward. One possible explanation for this result is that Regulation FD lowered the 
information asymmetry cost component of the bid/ask spread. Another is that the order 
processing cost per share fell as a result of the 48 percent increase in average daily 
trading volume from 450 thousand shares in the first sub-period to 668 thousand in the 
second. Yet another is that the market making in NASDAQ stocks became more 
competitive. Although the average number of dealers per stock falls from 89 in the first 
sub-period to 79 in the second, the average value of the Herfindahl index falls from .1194 
to .1076. The fact that there are competing explanations for the reduction in spread shows 
                                                 
18 Another approach is to infer the equivalent number of independent market makers by using the modified 
Herfindahl index. 1-MHI is the proportion of market makers who are competitive. Multiplying the average 
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the danger in using changes in the level of the bid/ask spread as a gauge of whether 
Regulation FD was effective. In order to make such an assessment, the cost components 
of the spread must be separated. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 also suggest that other components of the 
spread have also changed. The reduction in share price from the first sub-period to the 
second suggests that inventory-holding costs have fallen. On the other hand, the return 
volatility of stocks has increased on average, which means inventory-holding costs may 
have increased.  
B. Regression results using at-the-money option to value inventory-holding premium  
Table 3 contains a summary of the preliminary regression results. All of the t-
ratios are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals. Panel A 
(Panel B) contains the results for the regressions that use equal-weighted quoted spread 
(volume-weighted effective spread) as the dependent variable. The first three rows in 
each panel are the results of the BSW model when an at-the-money option is used to 
value the inventory-holding premium. See Eq. (1). The second three rows contain the 
results of an ad hoc spread regression of the type used in past work. The ad hoc 
regression specification is 
0 1 2 3 4 5i i i i i i iSPRD InvTV MHI S tα α α α α σ α ε= + + + + + + ,  (16) 
and is intended to serve as a benchmark with which to judge the effectiveness of the 
BSW model. 
The results shown in Panel A of Table 3 indicate that all cost components are 
important determinants of the quoted bid/ask spreads. The single most important 
explanatory variable appears to be the inventory-holding premium. Its coefficient 
estimate is greater than one, indicating that, as expected, the average time between trades 
is a downward biased estimate of the expected length of the market maker’s holding 
period.19 The sign and the significance of the coefficient 2α  indicates that competition 
                                                                                                                                                 
time between trades by 1-MHI and then by the number of market makers should produce the average time 
between trades for a typical market maker.  
19 Later in this section, we allow the data to identify the average of the square root of the time between 
trades. 
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among market makers also plays an important role in determining the absolute level of 
the bid/ask spread. The higher the modified Herfindahl index (the lower the competition), 
the greater the spread. The coefficient estimate of 0.0525 in the post-Regulation FD sub-
period, for example, implies that the quoted bid/ask spread will be 5.25 cents higher in a 
market with a monopolist than a market with perfect competition. The coefficient of 
competition in the first sub-period is positive but insignificant. The inverse of trading 
volume also enters significantly. Its magnitude is much smaller in the second sub-period 
than in the first, indicating perhaps that the fixed cost per share of market making has 
fallen. Finally, recall that our model Eq. (1) is structured so that the level of the intercept 
term equals the minimum tick size. The estimate of the intercept term 0α  in the first-sub-
period is 0.0517, which is slightly less than the exchange-mandated 0.0625 (one-
sixteenth). The intercept is 0.0419 in the second sub-period. 
The first three rows of Panel B contain the regression results when volume-
weighted effective spread is used instead of equal-weighted quoted spread as the 
dependent variable. Because many trades take place within the prevailing price quotes, 
effective spread is a more accurate measure of market maker revenue. Like in the quoted 
spread regression, expected inventory-holding premium has the greatest explanatory 
power. The expected inventory-holding premium coefficient estimate is less than it was 
for the quoted spread. Still, it remains considerably higher than its theoretical value of 
one. The intercept estimates are lower than the regression for quoted spread. This is not 
surprising given that the effective spread can have values as low as zero.20 The estimate, 
0.0412 in the first sub-period, for example, represents the level of revenue per share that 
the market maker can expect to earn for providing liquidity in an extremely active stock. 
The estimate in the second sub-period is 0.0347, showing that the level of spread for 
active stocks has fallen. 
The second three rows in each panel of Table 3 illustrate what can happen when 
the determinants of spread are specified in an ad hoc fashion. In place of using the BSW 
model, we include share price, return volatility, and the average time between trades (the 
                                                 
20 The effective spread equals zero in instances in which the quoted spread is an even number of ticks and 
the trade takes place at the midpoint. 
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determinants of the inventory-holding premium) together with the inverse of trading 
volume and the modified Herfindahl index as the determinants of spread. Furthermore, 
suppose we assume the relation is linear, as is done in some of the past studies.  
The results reported for the ad hoc regression are striking in a number of ways. 
First, the order-processing cost component of spread increases dramatically. This is 
curious considering the significant increase in trading volume post-Regulation FD. 
Second, while the coefficient of share price is significant and has its expected sign, the 
coefficient of return volatility is insignificant and the coefficient of the average time 
between trades is significant but has the wrong sign. Third, the adjusted R-squared levels 
in the ad hoc regression are dramatically less than for the BSW model (e.g., 0.4029 in the 
first sub-period for the ad hoc regression versus 0.7772 for the properly specified model). 
These results emphasize the importance of model specification. Although both 
regressions contain the same independent variables, knowing the proper variable 
definitions and model structure substantially improves performance.  
C. Estimating the probability and expected cost of informed trades 
We now turn to estimating the probability and expected cost of informed trading.  
As a preliminary investigation, we estimate the regression model, 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i t i t i t i t iSPRD InvTV MHI IHP d InvTV d MHI d IHPdα α α α α α α α ε= + + + + + + + +  
where td  is a dummy variable whose value is 0 in months preceding October 2000 and 1 
in months after October 2000.  The coefficients 4α through 7α , therefore, measure 
changes in the cost components of the bid/ask spread resulting from the implementation 
of Regulation FD. Panel A of Table 4 contains the results. For the most part, the cost 
components do not appear to have been affected by Regulation FD, with no significant 
changes reported for minimum tick size 4α , order processing costs 5α , and inventory-
holding premium 7α . The only variable whose coefficient changed significantly is 
competition 6α . One possible explanation for this result is that market makers in less 
competitive markets increased spreads post-Regulation FD to compensate for the 
increased prospect of informed trading. In more competitive markets, this may not have 
been possible. 
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 To further isolate the effect of informed trading on the bid/ask spread, we focus 
on the components of inventory-holding premium. Recall that the inventory-holding 
premium, as modeled in Eq. (1), incorporates the trades of both uninformed and informed 
traders. While the results in Panel A show no change in the contribution of IHP to the 
bid/ask spread, it is possible that the informed trader IIHP  changed in one direction and 
the uninformed trader UIHP  in the other. To test this proposition, we substitute Eq. (9) 
into the regression model. In place of using a single at-the-money option to value the 
inventory-holding premium, we use an out-of-the-money option value for uniformed 
trades and an in-the-money option for informed trades. Valuing the out-of-the-money 
option, we assume that the true stock price is the midpoint between the bid and ask prices 
and that the exercise price is the bid or the ask depending on whether the customer’s trade 
was a sale or a purchase. To value the in-the-money option, however, is more difficult. 
While we know the option’s exercise price (i.e., the ask price on a customer purchase and 
the bid price on a customer sale), we do not know the true price. All that we know is that 
the true price exceeds the ask price for an informed buy and is below the bid price for an 
informed sell. Consequently, in the estimation of regression model (12), we allow the true 
price to have a premium from one percent to ten percent over the option’s exercise price. 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. 
The results reported in the Panel B of Table 4 are interesting in a number of 
respects. First, as the insider’s “true” price rises relative to the exercise price, the 
probability that the trade was executed by an insider falls. This stands to reason since the 
product of the probability of an informed trade and the insider inventory-holding 
premium is nearly constant, as we discussed in Section II. Second, once IIHP  is six 
percent in the money, the adjusted R-squared value reaches its maximum value of .7801. 
What this indicates is that, while we should be comfortable with models in which IIHP  is 
at least six percent in the money, we cannot partition the expected adverse selection cost 
into its probability of informed trading and expected loss from informed trading 
components. Third, over this maximal adjusted R-squared range, the estimate of the 
probability of an informed trade 4α is significant but has a value of less than one percent. 
When one considers how little informed trading that actually takes place in a single stock 
 23 
on any given day, the estimate seems plausible.21  Fourth, the coefficient 9α  is 
significantly positive independent of the degree to which IIHP  is in the money. The 
evidence indicates the probability of informed trading rose after the introduction of 
Regulation FD.  
Tables 3 and 4 are based on a comparison of spreads five months before the 
implementation of Regulation FD and five months after. A potential problem with this 
approach is that the information flow is averaged across the months in each sub-period. 
In reality, information flow is liable to have a seasonal behavior as a result of reporting 
activities such as quarterly earnings announcements. Consequently, to test the robustness 
of our results, we compare spreads in months separated by a quarter. Two of the 
comparisons straddle the month in which Regulation FD was implemented—August 
2000 vs. November 2000 and September 2000 vs. December 2000. Two of the 
comparisons are on either side—June 2000 vs. September 2000 and November 2000 vs. 
February 2001. If Regulation FD affected the adverse information component of spread, 
there should be a significant difference detected in the first two comparisons but not in 
the second. The percent ITM of the IIHP  is set equal to ten percent. Table 5 contains a 
summary of the results. Focusing on the coefficient 9α , we see that the probability of 
informed trading increased significantly in the quarter to quarter comparisons that 
straddle the implementation of Regulation FD, and stayed the same in the quarter to 
quarter comparisons on either side. While this evidence should not be viewed as being 
independent of the results reported in Table 4, it corroborates the notion that Regulation 
FD has affected information flow.  
The significance of the coefficient 9α in the regression results of Table 3 allow us 
to conclude the probability of informed trading has increased significantly. It also allows 
us to estimate the dollar size of the increase in the expected cost of adverse selection. 
Indeed, we can figure out the relative size of each of the cost components of the spread 
before and after Regulation FD to determine whether there has been an effect by 
                                                 
21 Presumably, inside information is extraordinary and has a material effect on share price (e.g., a firm 
discovers that it has become a takeover target). For a typical firm in our sample, the number of such events 
is very small. 
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computing the average value of each of the independent variables in the regression, 
multiplying by its respective coefficient, and then dividing by the average spread. Table 6 
contains the results. As the table shows, there has been a shift in the weighting assigned 
to each cost category. Focusing on the results that maximize adjusted R-squared (rows in 
which 6 percentITM ≥ ), we see that order processing costs are about 11-12 percent of 
the volume-weighted effective spread and did not change much after Regulation FD. The 
premium attached to competition, however, increased from about 2.5 percent of the 
spread to about 7 percent. Inventory-holding costs are the single largest cost component 
of spread, and fell in the post-Regulation FD sub-period. The adverse selection 
component rose from about 6¾ percent to about 10¾ percent of the volume-weighted 
effective spread. In dollar terms, this amounts to .0675 $.1323×  or $.00893 per share pre-
Regulation FD and .1075 $.1143×  or $.01229 post—an increase of 38 percent. 
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that Regulation FD did, in fact, have a chilling 
effect, causing inside information to become more valuable and long-lived and market 
makers to demand greater adverse selection risk premium.  
 
V. SUMMARY 
Regulation FD, imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
October 2000, was designed to create a level playing field by prohibiting selective 
disclosure of material private information to particular groups such as analysts. Exactly 
what advantage analysts gain is unclear. If multiple insiders receive identical information, 
the information is immediately incorporated in price and the expected profit of each 
insider is zero. Regardless of the SEC’s motivation in imposing Regulation FD, empirical 
investigation has shown that it has had a chilling effect, with firms now disclosing less 
information. With less information flow, private information becomes more long-lived 
and valuable. With increased risk of providing immediacy to informed traders, market 
makers will demand increased compensation, widening the bid/ask spread. To test this 
proposition, we identify the cost components of the bid/ask spread for a sample of 
NASDAQ stocks in the period just before and just after the implementation of Regulation 
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FD. The evidence indicates that Regulation FD has led to an increase in the expected cost 
of the adverse selection component of the spread.   
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Table 1. Simulated probability of informed trade given percent premium of true price over 
ask price for informed traders. Stock price is set equal to $27.50, bid/ask spread is $.10, and the 
volatility rate is 50 percent. Spread is assumed to be equal to 
 
(1 )I U I ISPRD p IHP p IHP= − + , 
 
where Ip  (1 Ip− ) is the probability of an informed (uniformed) trade, and IIHP  ( UIHP ) is the 
expected inventory holding premium for informed (uninformed) trades. UIHP  is an out-of-the-
money call option with the stock price equal to the bid/ask midpoint and an exercise price equal 
to the ask price. IIHP  is an in-the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price, 
and a stock price equal to the exercise price plus a “Percent ITM” premium.  
 
 
Percent
ITM 5 10 15 20 25 30
1% 31.53% 27.20% 23.22% 19.45% 15.85% 12.40%
2% 15.20% 12.78% 10.74% 8.91% 7.23% 5.64%
3% 10.02% 8.34% 6.95% 5.73% 4.62% 3.58%
4% 7.47% 6.19% 5.14% 4.22% 3.39% 2.62%
5% 5.95% 4.92% 4.07% 3.34% 2.68% 2.07%
6% 4.95% 4.08% 3.38% 2.76% 2.21% 1.71%
7% 4.24% 3.49% 2.88% 2.36% 1.89% 1.46%
8% 3.70% 3.04% 2.51% 2.06% 1.64% 1.27%
9% 3.29% 2.70% 2.23% 1.82% 1.46% 1.12%
10% 2.96% 2.43% 2.00% 1.64% 1.31% 1.01%
Number of minutes between trades
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Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics of variables used in the cross-sectional regressions of 
spreads for NASDAQ stocks. EWQS  is the equal-weighted quoted bid/ask spread; VWES  is the 
volume-weighted effective bid/ask spread; REWQS  and RVWES  are the equal-weighted quoted and 
volume-weighted effective bid/ask spreads divided by share price, respectively; S  is the share price; TV  
is the number of shares traded in thousands; ND  is the number of dealers; MHI is the modified 
Herfindahl index; σ  is the annualized return volatility of the stock computed over the  most recent sixty 
trading days prior to the estimation month; t  is the average of the square root of the number of minutes 
between trades; and IHP  is expected inventory-holding premium as defined by  ( )2 .5 1IHP S N tσ= −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
To be included in the sample, the stock must have traded at least five times each day in every day during 
the month. The sub-periods are the five months before and the five months after the imposition of 
Regulation FD in October 2000. 
 
Variable Mean 25% Median 75% Mean 25% Median 75%
Spread measures
EWQS 0.1814 0.1004 0.1465 0.2208 0.1515 0.0852 0.1252 0.1843
VWQS 0.1323 0.0772 0.1076 0.1577 0.1143 0.0681 0.0948 0.1360
REWQS 0.0181 0.0069 0.0128 0.0238 0.0217 0.0064 0.0125 0.0267
RVWES 0.0136 0.0050 0.0093 0.0178 0.0170 0.0049 0.0095 0.0207
Determinants of spread
S 21.64 5.65 13.41 28.11 17.48 4.44 12.13 25.06
TV 449.74 47.22 106.93 280.97 688.22 47.50 119.38 322.67
ND 89.06 43 67 110 79.41 33.75 56 97
MHI 0.1194 0.0772 0.1077 0.1454 0.1076 0.0666 0.0941 0.1306
  0.9063 0.6222 0.8531 1.1426 1.0073 0.6495 0.9362 1.2629
Sqrt t 1.285 0.668 1.179 1.829 1.227 0.598 1.088 1.793
IHP 0.0181 0.0071 0.0129 0.0231 0.0144 0.0056 0.0109 0.0187
Pre-Regulation FD
No. of observations = 8,706
Post-Regulation FD
No. of observations = 7,568
Period: May 2000 - September 2000 Period: November 2000 - March 2001
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Table 3. Summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute quoted and effective bid/ask 
spreads of NASDAQ stocks. iEWQS  is the equal-weighted quoted spread of stock i, iVWES  is the 
volume-weighted effective spread, iInvTV  is the inverse of the number of shares traded, MHI is the 
modified Herfindahl index, and iIHP  is the expected inventory-holding premium. The value of each 
variable, except iIHP  and MHI, is computed each trading day, and then the values are averaged across all 
days during the month. All months during the five-month period preceding Regulation FD (May 2000 
through September 2000) and during the five-month period after Regulation FD (November 2000 through 
March 2001) are included. The value of iIHP  is computed using  ( )2 .5 1i i i iIHP S N tσ= −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
where iS  is the average share price, iσ  is the annualized return volatility of the stock computed over the  
most recent sixty trading days prior to the estimation month, and it  is the average of the square root of 
the time between trades. To be included in the sample in a particular month, the stock must have traded at 
least five times each day in every day during the month. Panel A contains the regression results where the 
equal-weighted quoted spread is used as the dependent variable, and Panel B contains the results for the 
volume-weighted effective spread. The Bollen-Smith-Whaley regression specification is 
0 1 2 3: i i i i iBSW SPRD InvTV MHI IHPα α α α ε= + + + + , 
and the ad hoc regression specification is 
0 1 2 3 4 5 : i i i i i i iAd hoc SPRD InvTV MHI S tα α α α α σ α ε= + + + + + + . 
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No. of Adjusted
Period Model obs. R-squared
Panel A: Equal-weighted quoted spread
Pre BSW 8,706 0.8049 0.0517 806.49 0.0122 6.3746
14.12 9.82 0.62 32.02
Post BSW 7,568 0.7646 0.0419 788.08 0.0525 6.3376
16.56 9.23 3.27 32.26
Full BSW 16,274 0.7923 0.0462 784.05 0.0362 6.3882
20.14 11.73 2.58 42.09
Pre Ad hoc 8,706 0.4002 0.0344 3885.92 0.3636 0.0027 0.0189 -541.33
2.58 11.09 10.15 8.45 3.91 -6.16
Post Ad hoc 7,568 0.5199 0.0394 3400.80 0.3319 0.0029 -0.0052 -377.31
3.59 12.80 11.79 9.67 -1.36 -6.08
Full Ad hoc 16,274 0.4465 0.0375 3628.91 0.3722 0.0028 0.0032 -464.89
3.31 14.61 14.16 9.62 0.83 -7.30
Panel B: Volume-weighted effective spread
Pre BSW 8,706 0.7772 0.0412 786.57 -0.0194 4.4632
11.39 10.61 -1.28 21.16
Post BSW 7,568 0.7484 0.0347 708.98 0.0287 4.5269
14.81 10.58 2.32 24.47
Full BSW 16,274 0.7682 0.0379 749.86 0.0042 4.4893
16.37 13.57 0.39 28.10
Pre Ad hoc 8,706 0.4029 0.0290 3026.07 0.2335 0.0019 0.0140 -415.80
2.99 10.24 9.48 8.11 4.15 -6.11
Post Ad hoc 7,568 0.5231 0.0324 2624.86 0.2341 0.0020 -0.0032 -292.39
3.81 12.74 11.48 8.99 -1.11 -6.28
Full Ad hoc 16,274 0.4496 0.0315 2824.90 0.2479 0.0019 0.0029 -361.06
3.78 14.08 13.67 9.18 1.07 -7.53
Coefficient estimates/t-ratios
0 0ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 1 1ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 2 2ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 3 3ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 4 4ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 5 5ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α
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Table 4. Summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute effective bid/ask spreads of NASDAQ stocks. iVWES  is the volume-
weighted effective spread, iInvTV  is the inverse of the number of shares traded, MHI is the modified Herfindahl index, and iIHP  is the expected 
inventory-holding premium. The value of each variable, except iIHP  and MHI, is computed each trading day, and then the values are averaged 
across all days during the month. The value of iIHP  is computed using  ( )2 .5 1i i i iIHP S N tσ= −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
where iS  is the average share price, iσ  is the annualized return volatility of the stock computed over the  most recent sixty trading days prior to 
the estimation month, and it  is the average of the square root of the time between trades. To be included in the sample, the stock must have 
traded at least five times each day in every day during the month. All months during the five-month period preceding Regulation FD (May 2000 
through September 2000) and during the five-month period after Regulation FD (November 2000 through March 2001) are included. The 
regression model is 
0 1 2 3 , 4 , ,
5 6 7 8 , 9 , ,
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i i i U i i I i i U i i
t i t i t U i i t I i i U i i t i
VWES InvTV MHI IHP IHP IHP
d InvTV d MHI d IHP d IHP IHP d
α α α α τ α τ τ
α α α α τ α τ τ ε
= + + + + −
+ + + + + − + , 
where ,U iIHP  is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and ,I iIHP  is the expected inventory-holding 
premium for trades with informed traders. For a trade at the ask, the value of ,k iIHP  is computed using 
( ) ( ), ,
, ,
ln ln
.5 .5k i i k i ik i k i i i i i i
i ii i
S X S X
IHP S N t X N t
tt
σ σσσ
= + − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
,U iIHP  is valued as an out-of-the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price equal to the bid/ask midpoint. 
,I iIHP  is valued as an in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price equal to the ask price and a stock price Percent ITM above the 
exercise price. For a trade at the bid, the IHP is valued using a put option formula with an exercise price equal to the bid price. 
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Percent No. of Adjusted
ITM obs. R-squared
Panel A: Single composite inventory-holding premium
16,274 0.7685 0.0412 786.56 -0.0194 4.4632 -0.0065 -77.56 0.0481 0.0637
11.39 10.67 -1.28 21.18 -1.61 -0.85 2.72 0.24
Panel B: Separate inventory-holding premia for uninformed and informed traders
1 16274 0.6690 0.0357 1267.90 0.0653 1.0921 0.0951 -0.0114 46.70 0.0525 -0.1597 0.0497
8.43 12.62 3.10 12.80 8.59 -2.35 0.36 2.34 -1.58 3.86
2 16274 0.7796 0.0303 905.30 0.0252 0.9419 0.0218 -0.0077 -33.36 0.0490 -0.0274 0.0144
10.28 11.87 1.50 17.55 6.78 -2.01 -0.34 2.53 -0.42 3.28
3 16274 0.7798 0.0302 908.57 0.0256 0.9378 0.0144 -0.0078 -31.27 0.0493 -0.0314 0.0097
10.49 11.88 1.51 17.14 6.50 -2.05 -0.31 2.52 -0.48 3.21
4 16274 0.7799 0.0301 909.92 0.0257 0.9350 0.0108 -0.0078 -30.09 0.0495 -0.0340 0.0074
10.59 11.88 1.51 16.89 6.36 -2.07 -0.30 2.52 -0.51 3.19
5 16274 0.7800 0.0301 910.54 0.0259 0.9332 0.0086 -0.0078 -29.41 0.0496 -0.0357 0.0059
10.64 11.88 1.51 16.74 6.29 -2.08 -0.29 2.52 -0.53 3.19
6 16,274 0.7801 0.0301 910.84 0.0259 0.9318 0.0072 -0.0079 -28.96 0.0497 -0.0368 0.0050
10.67 11.88 1.51 16.64 6.26 -2.09 -0.29 2.52 -0.55 3.19
7 16274 0.7801 0.0301 911.01 0.0260 0.9308 0.0062 -0.0079 -28.72 0.0497 -0.0376 0.0043
10.67 11.88 1.52 16.58 6.25 -2.09 -0.29 2.52 -0.56 3.19
8 16274 0.7801 0.0301 911.11 0.0260 0.9300 0.0054 -0.0079 -28.59 0.0498 -0.0382 0.0037
10.68 11.88 1.52 16.53 6.24 -2.09 -0.29 2.52 -0.57 3.19
9 16274 0.7801 0.0301 911.17 0.0260 0.9294 0.0048 -0.0079 -28.52 0.0497 -0.0387 0.0033
10.68 11.88 1.52 16.50 6.24 -2.09 -0.29 2.52 -0.57 3.19
10 16274 0.7801 0.0301 911.19 0.0260 0.9289 0.0043 -0.0079 -28.46 0.0497 -0.0390 0.0030
10.68 11.88 1.52 16.47 6.24 -2.10 -0.28 2.52 -0.58 3.19
Coefficient estimates/t-ratios
0 0ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 1 1ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 2 2ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 3 3ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 4 4ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 5 5ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 6 6ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 7 7ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 8 8ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 9 9ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α
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Table 5. Summary of cross-sectional regression results of absolute quoted and effective bid/ask spreads of NASDAQ stocks. iVWES  is the 
volume-weighted effective spread, iInvTV  is the inverse of the number of shares traded, MHI is the modified Herfindahl index, and iIHP  is the 
expected inventory-holding premium. The value of each variable, except iIHP  and MHI, is computed each trading day, and then the values are 
averaged across all days during the month. All months during the five-month period preceding Regulation FD (May 2000 through September 
2000) and during the five-month period after Regulation FD (November 2000 through March 2001) are included. The regression specification is 
0 1 2 3 , 4 , ,
5 6 7 8 , 9 , ,
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
i i i U i i I i i U i i
t i t i t U i i t I i i U i i t i
VWES InvTV MHI IHP IHP IHP
d InvTV d MHI d IHP d IHP IHP d
α α α α τ α τ τ
α α α α τ α τ τ ε
= + + + + −
+ + + + + − +  
where td  is a dummy variable whose value is 0 in months preceding October 2001 and 1 in months after October 2001. ,U iIHP  is the expected 
inventory-holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and ,I iIHP  is the expected inventory-holding premium for trades with informed 
traders. The value of ,k iIHP  is computed using 
( ) ( ), ,
, ,
ln ln
.5 .5k i i k i ik i k i i i i i i
i ii i
S X S X
IHP S N t X N t
tt
σ σσσ
= + − −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, 
where iσ  is the annualized return volatility of the stock computed over the  most recent sixty trading days prior to the estimation month, it  is 
the average of the square root of the time between trades. ,U iIHP  is valued as an out-of-the-money call option with an exercise price equal to the 
ask price and a stock price equal to the bid/ask midpoint. ,I iIHP  is valued as a ten percent in-the-money (ITM) call option with an exercise price 
equal to the ask price and a stock price.  
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First Second No. of Adjusted
month month obs. R-squared
Panel A: Three months apart and surrounding intervention month
Aug-00 Nov-00 3,215 0.6748 0.0414 1367.42 0.0253 1.0561 0.0148 -0.0081 252.48 0.0625 0.0355 0.0078
7.73 10.03 0.66 10.56 6.20 -1.85 1.39 1.67 0.24 2.85
Sep-00 Dec-00 3,292 0.6796 0.0410 1062.24 0.0875 1.0856 0.0133 -0.0045 691.32 -0.0206 -0.0548 0.0081
7.24 6.61 3.23 12.10 8.11 -0.68 2.90 -0.52 -0.29 2.24
Panel B: Three months apart and on either side of intervention month
Jun-00 Sep-00 3,499 0.6558 0.0386 1358.69 0.0413 1.0411 0.0170 0.0030 -261.00 0.0497 0.1891 -0.0029
9.05 7.44 1.44 12.20 8.45 0.44 -1.14 1.34 1.52 -1.65
Nov-00 Feb-01 3,023 0.6708 0.0336 1659.17 0.0908 1.1978 0.0236 -0.0022 -703.22 -0.0313 -0.3494 -0.0035
7.56 10.86 3.34 6.18 7.27 -0.47 -4.13 -0.96 -1.79 -1.02
0 0ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 1 1ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 2 2ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 3 3ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 4 4ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 5 5ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 6 6ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 7 7ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 8 8ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α 9 9ˆ ˆ/ ( )tα α
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Table 6. Summary of cost components of absolute effective bid/ask spreads of NASDAQ 
stocks. The notation is defined as follows: iVWES  is the volume-weighted effective spread, 
iInvTV  is the inverse of the number of shares traded, MHI is the modified Herfindahl index , and 
iIHP  is the expected inventory holding premium. The value of each variable, except iIHP  and 
MHI, is computed each trading day and then the values are averaged across all days during the 
month. To be included in the sample, the stock must have traded at least five times each day in 
every day during the month. The estimates are for the regression, 
0 1 2 , 4 , ,( ) ( ( ) ( ))i i i U i i I i i U i i iSPRD InvTV MHI IHP IHP IHPα α α τ α τ τ ε= + + + + − + , 
where ,U iIHP  is the expected inventory holding premium for trades with uninformed traders and 
,I iIHP  is the expected inventory holding premium for trades with informed traders. The 
regression is run in both the pre period (May 2000 – September 2000) and the post period 
(November 2000 – March 2001). Cost components are computed using the method outlined in 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2003). 
 
Minimum Order Inventory Adverse
Percent tick processing holding selection
ITM size costs Competition costs costs
1 26.97% 15.46% 5.89% 37.26% 14.41%
21.23% 18.32% 11.08% 28.72% 20.65%
2 22.91% 11.04% 2.27% 57.80% 5.98%
19.77% 12.15% 6.98% 51.78% 9.33%
3 22.81% 11.08% 2.31% 57.55% 6.25%
19.60% 12.22% 7.05% 51.32% 9.81%
4 22.77% 11.10% 2.32% 57.38% 6.42%
19.51% 12.26% 7.08% 51.02% 10.13%
5 22.75% 11.11% 2.33% 57.27% 6.54%
19.46% 12.28% 7.10% 50.82% 10.34%
6 22.74% 11.11% 2.34% 57.18% 6.63%
19.43% 12.29% 7.12% 50.68% 10.49%
7 22.73% 11.11% 2.34% 57.12% 6.69%
19.41% 12.29% 7.12% 50.57% 10.60%
8 22.73% 11.11% 2.34% 57.08% 6.74%
19.40% 12.30% 7.13% 50.50% 10.68%
9 22.72% 11.11% 2.35% 57.04% 6.78%
19.40% 12.30% 7.13% 50.44% 10.74%
10 22.72% 11.11% 2.35% 57.01% 6.81%
19.40% 12.30% 7.13% 50.39% 10.78%
 
